Islam V. Modernization

17 02 2007

How (or should) you reconcile Islamic fervor with modernization? In a country deep with Islamic Culture is it important for Iran to have a liberal democracy that would extend fundamental rights to it citizens?

Iran is a nation wrought in religious ideals and a hope for an increasing wellness of the state. Concerned with revitalizing nationalism, several leaders, from past Shahs to recent Ayatollahs, have given Iran a new outlook on egoism and glory.

The very existence of government in any country provides that the society should be ruled and therein guidance will be warranted to provide that [they] the citizens are protected—in at least one form or another. In some instances that means oppression. However those with the power came into the position of authority, they will and do have a hand in policies that are initiated, implemented, etc. It’s a power struggle. Iran’s government is drenched in technicalities—the higher level clerics, religious leaders that answer only to Allah, galvanize what policies will be amenable according to the text of Islam, Qur’an; the Supreme Leader is the ultimate head of Iran’s political structure, but can be ousted with legitimate reason by the Assembly of Experts, directly elected by a public vote, suggesting a higher degree of accountability; the President of Iran is also elected directly by “the people” and runs the executive branch of government. Even with the seemingly efficacious arrangement, the fact remains that there is a closed loop of possibility because the Guardian Council, appointed by the Supreme Leader, must still review and “consider” which candidates are truly worthy of running before any common Iranian makes a trip to the polls. Indefinitely, this taints the image of such a system because the very hope of making a difference, or some concept that any one individual can play a major role, becomes limited when reality strikes.

Democracy is not for everyone and every nation. Theoretically, democracy seems like the best political ideology to set into motion because it welcomes privatization, technological innovation, protects rights and freedoms, exercises a representative body and characterizes pluralism and epitomizes the “(American) Dream”—the ideal that any average Joe has the opportunity to and can climb the social and economic ladder, rung by rung, to gain any and all the wealth and assets he can manage. Incentives are always agreeable. But Iran is not in conjunction with such practices. It cannot be entirely blamed on mullahs trying to get rich or the existence and imposition of other more liberal countries, but rather the traditionalist state that Iran embodies; they, the heads of government, are clinging to religious laws and trying to do what is in the best interests of the state. If you cry for modernization, you’re labeled a jingoist and if you deny the need for some implementation of such advancements, you’re too much of a humanitarian. Tolerance doesn’t equate ignorance.

Proponents of democracy boast that it creates economic stability, personified by Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand, Thomas Jefferson’s Laissez Faire and the elements of Vilfredo Pareto’s Principle, and so many other idealists. It’s an advantage of opportunism and often, the semblance of unscrupulous behavior. Can you really blame Islamists for wanting to fight against such things, even if they do provoke Anti-American behavior and Anti-Imperialistic sentiment by burning the U.S. flag and proclaiming “Death to America”?

Iran is fearful of America’s super patriot nature and its piestic tendencies, to take the world’s problems on its own shoulders and save [it] from its own demise. Iran is fed up with self-righteous acts and effusive talks on “diplomacy”.

So long as Iran upholds the Shar’ia and the beliefs of Islam, to incorporate morals and basic religious contexts for leading a life of altruism and modesty, the precepts of self-preservation and elements of hedonism emulated by an individual’s private sphere and safeguarded liberties will conflict with those that characterize a liberal democracy. Iran perceives the United States of America as an empire manifested for and by megalomania, like that of Caligula. Modernization increases infrastructure and awareness. However, the exportation of Democracy, coined a factor of globalization, wreaks havoc on the very establishment of the preexisting institutions of government already in place in such foreign nations, id est Iran. A democracy is a safe haven for factions, interested in perpetuating their claims for interest’s sake; they remain to protect and invoke a continuing awareness of their affectations. Iran’s theocracy belies these ostentations, as the civility of the people and their subordination surpasses any debts between the linkage institution of government and Iranians’ obedience. The personal sovereignty of such individuals is Iran’s scapegoat for eminent domain. Be it in the name of Allah or by general authority of leading religious officials, decisions made by the highest levels of government without a consensus of the Iranians is a derision to the dynamics of a liberal democracy.

The Iranian people hardly have an ability, much less an opportunity, to get involved and really play a card in the deal of the majority of the laws that are enacted, and they wish for hardcore reformation to have more protected freedoms? What’s the point in acting forthright when the government allows and “guarantees” new liberties warranted from the Constitutional Revolution of 1979, but they are ignored in practice? With more than muffled screams of disillusion, it is no wonder there’s a large question mark employed by the doubt that Iranian qualms for just deserves are shut out by the engagement of religion and law. The ramifications of such constraints have caused citizens’ blood to boil for aspirations of more—more than docility and submission. Ethics conceives a new dimension for standard “freedoms”—a prerequisite for such might entail a common ground amidst major world religions, their sects, the numerous philosophies of each and how they deal with the state—‘fundamental’ meaning the most humane and basic freedoms that individuals, regardless of race, creed, religion, etc. deserve. Modernization cannot completely rectify such quandaries. Often times it endows more confusion and squeezes the higher authorities because there are new contexts of “fundamental rights”; it varies according to the setting because not every individual endures the same scrapes and derives the same culture. The very core dilemma of the human existence is finding neutrality between the ties to personal thought and the extension of others’ experience. When these differences are shed, these worries are soothed. The Islamic Republic’s greatest flaw is the Iranian citizens’ coercion and strict terms for potential—complacency would suggest a lack thereof. The Iranians need an incentive, in the least, and modernization may be the catenation between more efficacy and new liberties in Iran.