Is Putin’s presidency a sign that Russia is again becoming an authoritarian state and that its fling with democracy is now over?
The beginning of the Cold War was initiated with the collapse of Nazi Germany and the need to fill the resulting power vacuum which led to the disintegration of the wartime partnership; the purposes of the Allies were simply too divergent: Churchill sought to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Central Europe; Stalin wanted to be paid in territorial coin for Soviet military victories and the heroic suffering of the Russian people; the new President of the U.S., Harry S. Truman, intially strove to continue Roosevelt’s legacy of holding the alliance together. However, every vestige of wartime harmony had vanished. The Soviet Union and the United States, the two giants at the periphery, were now facing off against one another in the very heart of Europe. Truman was thrust into a world of contemporary diplomacy and the age of the atom bomb, when previously he only had to manage the Senate, and as Roosevelt’s understudy, he had a limited projection on the grave matters at hand: his call of duty went so far as to provide him the opportunity to take the then-President’s place should he become incapitated, incarcerated, etc. As was the case with Roosevelt’s deteriorating health, there was a necessity for him to relinquish his position of authority and place the “magic stick”, as it were, in the hands of his subordinate and soon to be successor. Truman’s three month tenure as Vice-President served little to inform him of the true state of policy and grounds for making decisions proactive to national security, muchless on a global scale. He would come to find that the gravity of tensions already instilled in nations with opposing political ideologies were much more grandiose than credited by special terms coined by political analysts and cabinet advisors, like containment, Four Policemen, collective security, etc. Therein, Truman inherited an international environment whose dividing lines were inchoately based on the position of armies advancing from east and west. The political fate of the countries liberated by Allied armies had not yet been resolved. Most of the traditional Great Powers still had to adjust to their changed roles. France was prostrate; Great Britain, though victorious, was exhausted; Germany was being carved into four occupation zones–having haunted Europe with its strength since 1871, its impotence now threatened it with chaos. Stalin’s wishes were to extend the Soviet frontier, while keeping a tight grip on Germany and thereby taking advantage of the creation of the vacuum that proposed the weakness of Western Europe.
Although decades ago, the remnants of a shattered past have saturated Russia’s premium policies–even still. The disillusion of recent attempts and motions for democracy have been tainted because of Russia’s past and her experience with what democracy once represented. The collapse of Communism provided an open door for policies and enterprise of Democracy, however the dissociation of Democracy and liberalism has left the Russian country in a stalemate. Reforms were instituted and progress has taken root (perhaps some more regressive than others). There’s no doubt. However many of these changes were bent for the welfare of those with more authority. In theory, democracy enacts legitimacy. Russia cannot claim such with idiomatic misconceptions of its basic precepts when its actors are busy justifying the economic failures with a few shoddy political reforms. The existence of Nomenklatura has been one of many fresh scars for any tendencies of hope for a true democracy. Hypothetically, democracy enables any character who participates and plays an active role for change to become part of the process, and to climb the rungs of government [directly or indirectly]. Elitism strangles any chance of this legitimate proactivism.
Fear does not always provide an opportunity for prosperity. Choosing to implement any rule with a foundation of authoritarian ideals and mark it with a new title does not change the fleeting validity of any man in power. Yeltsin’s lack of competence to provide the people of Russia with a working definition of democracy has crippled the asset of belief. Mobilization will not be and is not effective so long as those in power miscontrue the principle to those voting. Efficacy is maimed.
The large amount of restructure that took place on behalf of Gorbachev’s intiatives with perestroika gave a shout for the risks of change and the hopes that something better would evolve, but privatization was carried out in such a way that instead of contributing to a growing private sector, it only resulted in corruption and mass theft. Needless to remind you all that shock therapy in any case outside the realm of medical phenomenon is generally a bad idea. It’s a hardline guarantee with quick measures of stunting inflation by easing prices and the cessation of state owned enterprises. Hello privatization. Don’t think democracy has a snowball chance in hell if all it ever took was economic liberalization. Russians had no clue what an incentive was and suddenly they were given an option to claim ownership and such policies belied all they had ever known; of course they were confused and distraught. Democracy isn’t about the price of goods but often times, their relative value. The Russian nation was in trouble. Cultural homogeneity and audacious nationalism has
never been a matter of concern for Russia. Now, many Russians have become accustomed to the modernization for rights and expectations of consumerism when before waited for hours in line for staples. The current economic boom has allowed Putin the ability to get a grip on the Russian political culture. But what good and how efficacious is a true political culture when elections are limited by a margin less than all those who wish to believe/ choose to play a role in government and elections? Legislation has become a bit lax about issues of individual sovereignty and although there exist restrictions on the media, the grim reality of Mother Russian and her politics is that democracy has her roots in the days during the reign of Stalin and contemporary advantages of democracy have only been associated with economics because it’s the most immediate variable to which all can relate. The complexity of life in Russia has become an opprtunity for real efficacy, real legitimacy, and real liberalization (with some constraints where necessary, because there never was a cookie cutter version of democracy and her analogue should be most substantiated on that country’s past and that nation’s development). It’s obstensive that Russia is taking a semi-obvious detour toward previous authoritarian policies and behaviors. But considering her leap for democracy and mindless economic reforms, it’s no doubt the Russian people are dubious toward democracy’s effect. The leverage is that Putin can implement more than a one night stand with democracy but the cumbersome affectation is convincing the Russian people that such things are possible (and liberalization involves more than what’s in one’s wallet). The concern for generations to come will be teaming a gradual understanding and relationship between the government and the citizens that they will be guaranteed certain protected freedoms so long as they partcipate in their democracy, new elections and people will have an opportunity to become involved, and potential for making a difference that doesn’t involve inflation or elitist tendencies–a means of gaining the Russian peoples’ trust.
